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STATEMENT OF INTEREST1 
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freedom and its development in the courts: 
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Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
 
                                                 
1 Counsel of record for both parties received timely notice of the 
intent to file this brief.  See Sup. Ct. R. 37.  Counsel for both 
parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and their 
consents have been filed with this Court.  No counsel for either 
party authored the brief in whole or in part, and neither party 
nor their counsel made any monetary contribution intended to 
fund the brief’s preparation or submission.  
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Rodney K. Smith.   Professor of Practice, Sandra 
Day O’Conner College of Law, Arizona State 
University. 
   
Steven D. Smith.  Warren Distinguished Professor 
of Law, Co-Executive Director, Institute for Law & 
Religion, and Co-Executive Director, Institute for 
Law & Philosophy, University of San Diego. 
 
O. Carter Snead. William P. and Hazel B. White 
Director, Center for Ethics and Culture, and 
Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.  
 
 
 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Suppose a federal law required government 
officials to enter a Catholic church and use church 
property to distribute contraceptives and 
abortifacients over church’s objection.  Such a law 
would surely burden the church’s religion, even if the 
government paid for the objectionable medications 
and compensated the church for the use of its 
resources.  By commandeering church property, such 
a law would force the church to be complicit in 
activity to which it has serious religious objections. 
 
 That is what the government has done in this 
case.  The Little Sisters of the Poor are an order of 
Catholic nuns who object to being forced to 
participate in the distribution to their employees of 
contraceptives and abortifacients.2  The government 
insists that regulations of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) relieve the nuns of the 
obligation to pay for these drugs.  However, the 
government still commandeers health care plans 
created and controlled by the nuns and uses them to 
distribute contraceptives and abortifacients. State 
and federal law treat these health care plans as the 
property of the Little Sisters of the Poor.  The nuns 
thus make the unremarkable claim that the 
government substantially burdens their religion 
when it uses their property in ways that they find 
religiously offensive. 
                                                 
2  Petitioners include other religious organizations and their 
health care plans who are similarly situated to the Little Sisters 
of the Poor.  For convenience and clarity, however, this brief 
refers only to the Little Sisters of the Poor. 
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 The courts below in this and similar cases, 
however, have fundamentally misunderstood the 
nature of the burden created by the Department’s 
regulations. They thus frustrate Congressional policy 
requiring the government to justify its actions in 
such cases.  
 
 Specifically, the lower court focused on the 
fact that the Little Sisters of the Poor are not 
financially liable for contraception and that the 
paperwork requirements created by the 
Department’s regulations are minimal.  No one, 
however, claims that the nuns are being forced to 
directly purchase contraception, nor is their religion 
burdened because they have to fill out additional 
forms.  Such arguments miss the basic issue in this 
case. 
 
 The Department’s regulations exercise 
sweeping authority over religious institutions.  Given 
that many religious believers object to all or some of 
the drugs included in the contraceptive mandate, 
dozens of lawsuits challenging those regulations have 
been filed.  Hundreds of other institutions must also 
object to the Department’s regulations. The petition 
for certiorari should be granted so that this Court can 
resolve this “important question of federal law.” 
 
ARGUMENT  
 By commandeering the health care plan 
created, controlled, and owned by Petitioners, the 
Department’s regulations force them to participate in 
distributing religiously objectionable medications.   
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I. The Department’s regulations burden 
Petitioners’ religion by commandeering 
their property and using it to distribute 
contraceptives and abortifacients. 
 The burden imposed by the Department’s 
regulations can best be understood though analogies.  
Suppose that there was a law that required the nuns 
of the Little Sisters of the Poor to distribute 
contraceptives personally to their employees.  The 
government would pay for the contraceptives and 
compensate the nuns for their time and expenses, so 
there would be no financial complicity in the 
distribution of the medications.  Furthermore, the 
nuns would be free to voice their religious objections 
while distributing the contraceptives and the 
government would take steps to insure that anyone 
receiving contraceptives from the nuns understood 
their religious objections.  Such a law would clearly 
place a substantial burden on the nuns’ religious 
exercise.  Yet it would impose no financial burden on 
the nuns, and handing out the contraceptives could 
be done very easily, requiring far less effort than 
other regulatory requirements with which Petitioners 
must comply. 
  
 Now imagine that the law, rather than 
requiring that the nuns personally distribute the 
contraceptives, allowed a government official to enter 
the nuns’ facilities and use their medicine carts and 
other equipment to distribute contraceptives.  Again, 
the law would fully compensate the Little Sisters of 
the Poor for their financial costs.  Again, the nuns 
would be free to follow the medicine carts through 
their facility denouncing contraception and abortion, 
and the government could take steps to make clear 
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that the Little Sisters of the Poor object to the 
provision of contraceptives with the nuns’ property. 
Such a law would represent far more than a “de 
minimis” burden on the nuns’ religion.  Rather, it 
would directly burden the nuns’ religious exercise in 
the same way as the first hypothetical law, namely 
by making them an involuntary party to the 
distribution of medications to which they have 
serious and sincere religious objections.  The fact that 
this hypothetical law is directed at the nuns’ property 
rather than at their bodies does not change the fact 
that they would be forced to be complicit in what they 
sincerely regard as sinful behavior. 
 
 The Department’s regulations are analogous to 
this second law.  It is true that the Little Sisters of 
the Poor have no financial liability for the purchase 
of contraceptives, but they are not claiming that their 
religious exercise is burdened because they must 
purchase contraceptives.  Rather, the Little Sisters of 
the Poor have created a health care plan, a plan that 
they control and that is their property.  The 
government, in pursuit of its goals, is seeking to use 
the nuns’ plan to distribute contraceptives.  For the 
government to do this constitutes a burden on 
Petitioners’ religion, a burden that the court below 
failed to grasp or properly consider. 
 
A. State and federal law treat 
employer-provided health care plans 
as property of the employers, created 
and controlled by them. 
 Health insurance plans do not spring into 
existence ex nihilo, nor are they creations of the 
government.  Cf. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 
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882, 887 (1996) (“Nothing in ERISA requires 
employers to establish employee benefits plans.  Nor 
does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits 
employers must provide if they choose to have such a 
plan.”). Rather, they are devices of employers 
designed to provide employees with certain benefits 
as part of their compensation.  The health care plan 
of the Little Sisters of the Poor exists only because 
the Little Sisters of the Poor created it.   
 
As a matter of state law, employer-provided 
health insurance is a contract between the employer 
and the insurance provider to which the employee is 
generally treated as a third-party beneficiary. See, 
e.g., Southwest Health Plan, Inc. v. Sparkman, 921 
S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that an 
employee was  a third party beneficiary of a contract 
between the employer and its health insurance 
company); but see Cahill v. Eastern Benefit Systems, 
Inc., 603 N.E.2d 788, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding 
that an employee could not sue as a third-party 
beneficiary of a contract between an employer and 
the insurance company providing benefits to the 
employer’s employees).   
 
In the case of self-insurance by the employer, 
the relationship between the employer and the third 
party administrator (TPA) is also contractual. See, 
e.g., Multi-Craft Contractors Inc., v. Perico Ltd., 239 
S.W.3d 33 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding a dispute 
between a self-insured employer and its third-party 
administrator as a matter of contract law).  Once 
they are executed, contracts are, of course, a form of 
personal property.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS Ch. 15 Introductory Note (AM. LAW 
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INST. 1981) (noting that the law of assignment in 
contract “is part of the larger subject of transfer of 
intangible property.”).  
 
To be sure, insurance contracts are a very 
heavily regulated form of property.  See Timothy S. 
Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in 
Consumer Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 
395, 399 (2005) (“Health insurance is one of the most 
heavily regulated industries in the United States.”).  
Petitioners, however, are not challenging the 
authority of the government to regulate employer-
provided health insurance in general.3  Rather, they 
are challenging the lawfulness of the way in which 
the government has chosen to exercise that power in 
this particular case.  The fact that property is 
generally subject to government regulation does not 
alter the fundamental fact that it remains the 
property of its owner. 
 
 In other contexts, federal law treats employer-
provided health care plans as property of the 
employer.  For example, they may be assumed in 
bankruptcy and are treated as property of the 
employer’s bankruptcy estate.  See 11 U.S.C. §365 
(2012) (setting forth the trustee in bankruptcy’s 
power to assume executory contracts).  Although the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
the main federal statute governing employer-
                                                 
3 There are, however, complex questions in this case over the 
precise nature and scope of the government’s power to regulate 
Petitioners’ health care plans under ERISA and the ACA.  See 
Petition for Certiorari at 11-13. 
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provided insurance, does not govern Petitioners’ 
health care plan, this Court’s ERISA cases illustrate 
that health care plans are the creatures of their 
creators, namely employers.  This Court has noted 
that “[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are 
generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any 
time, to adopt, modify or terminate welfare plans.” 
Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. Schoonejongen, 514 
U.S. 73, 78 (1995).  This is true even though ERISA 
imposes on plan administrators fiduciary duties to 
plan beneficiaries. 4   “ERISA’s fiduciary duty 
requirement simply is not implicated where [an 
employer], acting as the Plan’s settlor, makes a 
decision regarding the form or structure of the Plan 
such as who is entitled to receive Plan benefits and in 
what amounts, or how such benefits are calculated.” 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444 
(1999).  Likewise, this Court has said that “decisions 
regarding the form or structure of a plan are 
generally settlor [i.e. employer] functions.” Beck v. 
Pace Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101-102 (2007) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted).  In short, 
federal law treats employer-provided health care 
plans as the creation and creature of the employer. 
 
 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that in ERISA argot, “plan administrators” 
and “third party administrators” are not the same thing.  “Plan 
administrators” are generally the employers who set up the 
plans.  “Third party administrators,” in contrast, are mere 
agents hired by the plan administrators to process claims and 
perform other clerical functions on behalf of employers. 
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B. The regulations use Petitioners’ 
health care plans to distribute 
contraceptives and abortifacients to 
which they have religious objections. 
 There are many ways in which the government 
could ensure that Petitioners’ employees have access 
to contraception without cost sharing, as required by 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  However, as the D.C. 
Circuit explained, what the Department’s regulations 
seek to do here is make obtaining contraception 
“seamless from the beneficiaries’ perspective.” Priests 
for Life v. Dept. of Health & Human Serv’s, 772 F.3d 
229, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  This “seamlessness,” 
however, is achieved only because the government 
uses the religious objectors’ plans to distribute 
contraceptives. Under the regulations, the TPA, an 
agent hired by the Little Sisters of the Poor and 
fireable by them, would process claims of employees 
to contraception and insure that the religiously 
offensive medications are distributed through 
Petitioners’ plan.  See 26 C.F.R. §54.9815-
2713AT(b)(2) (2015).  The only reason that the TPA 
has a relationship with Petitioners’ employees or 
access to the information necessary to provide them 
with contraception is because the TPA administers 
the Little Sisters of the Poor’s health care plan.  Thus, 
contrary to the suggestions of lower courts in similar 
cases, it is not true that “the acts that violate their 
faith are the acts of third parties.”  See East Texas 
Baptist University v. Burwell, 2015 WL 3852811, at 
*5 (5th Cir. 2015).   In this context, the TPA is not 
some remote stranger, a third-party unconnected 
with petitioners.  Rather the TPA is the nuns’ agent, 
administering the nuns’ plan. 
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The various attempts of the government to 
accommodate the religious objections of Petitioners’ 
do nothing to eliminate these concerns.  True, the 
government claims to relieve the Little Sisters of the 
Poor of financial complicity.  It is a non sequitur, 
however, to argue that because there is no financial 
burden, there is no burden of any kind.  See Thomas 
v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that 
the government violated the Free Exercise clause 
when it punished someone for refusing religiously 
objectionable but paid employment); Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (same).  Likewise, the 
employees would be notified in various ways that the 
Little Sisters of the Poor are not paying for 
contraceptives, See 26 C.F.R. §54.9815-2713A(d) 
(2015) (“The notice [from the TPA to employees] must 
specify that the eligible organization does not 
administer or fund contraceptive benefits”), but this 
does not change the fact that it is the nuns’ plan that 
is being used to purvey contraceptives to which they 
object.  It is this use of their property that constitutes 
a burden on Petitioners’ religion. 
 
II. The Court should grant certiorari 
because the lower courts have 
misunderstood the nature of the burden 
created by the Department’s regulations. 
 By misunderstanding the nature of the burden 
on religion created by the Department’s regulations, 
the lower courts threaten to deprive potentially 
hundreds of religious organizations of the protection 
afforded to them by Congress in the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Certiorari is thus 
warranted in this case because there is an “an 
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important question of federal law that… should be 
settled by this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). 
 
A. The lower courts mistakenly 
conceptualized the burden.  
The Tenth Circuit in this case misunderstood 
the burden placed on the religious exercise of the 
Little Sisters of the Poor by the Department’s 
regulations.  Its analysis focused on two issues.  The 
first was the fact that if the Little Sisters of the Poor 
were to invoke the Department’s regulations, the 
government would assume the financial costs of 
providing contraception to their employees. See Pet. 
App. 48a. (“The accommodation relieves the Plaintiffs 
from complying with the Mandate and guarantees 
that they will not have to … pay for … contraceptive 
coverage.”).   
 
The second was that filling out the paperwork 
required by the Department’s regulations imposed 
only a de minimis administrative burden.   Id. at 48a 
(“[T]hese de minimis administrative tasks do not 
substantially burden religious exercise for purposes 
of RFRA”).  Other lower courts faced with similar 
challenges to the Departments regulations have 
characterized the burdens imposed on religious 
objectors in similar terms. See, e.g., Priests for Life, 
772 F.3d at 249 (“A review of the regulatory 
accommodation shows that the opt-out mechanism 
imposes a de minimis requirement on any eligible 
organization”). This approach, however, is 
misconceived. 
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1. It is irrelevant that Petitioners are 
not financially liable. 
First, the fact that the government shoulders 
the financial costs of providing contraception to 
Petitioners’ employees is both unexceptional and 
irrelevant. The Office of Management and Budget 
estimates that in 2015 the federal government will 
spend $1.1 trillion on the health care of American 
citizens.  Office of Management & Budget, Table 15.1 
– Total Outlays for Health Programs: 1962-2020 
available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/.  
  
 These subsidies take the form of everything 
from financial support for basic medical research to 
paying directly for the medical procedures of millions 
of citizens.  Through the Department’s regulations, 
the government has opted to spend part of its health 
care budget on contraception.  There is nothing 
unusual about this.   It is also irrelevant to this case.   
 
One obviously cannot claim that one’s religious 
freedom is burdened when others behave in ways 
that one finds religiously objectionable.  As this 
Court observed in Bowen v. Roy, for example, 
religious freedom “simply cannot be understood to 
require that the Government conduct its own 
internal affairs in ways that comport with the 
religious beliefs of particular citizens.” Bowen v. Roy, 
476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).   
 
Contrary to the suggestion by the lower court, 
however, challengers to the Department’s regulations 
do not question this principle. See Pet. App. 91a 
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(“Plaintiffs sincerely oppose contraception, but their 
religious objection cannot hamstring government 
efforts to ensure that plan participants and 
beneficiaries receive the coverage to which they are 
entitled under the ACA.”); Priests for Life, 772 F.3d 
at 246 (“They have no RFRA right to be free from the 
unease, or even anguish, of knowing that third 
parties are legally privileged or obligated to act in 
ways their religion abhors.”).  The Little Sisters of 
the Poor are not claiming that their religion is 
burdened because the government pays for 
contraception to which they object.  Nor are they 
claiming that their religion is burdened because their 
employees might use medications at government 
expense that the nuns believe to be sinful.  In short, 
they are not trying to keep the government from 
providing contraception to their employees, nor are 
they seeking to limit their employees’ ability to 
obtain or use contraception at no expense. 
 
As long-time observers of this kind of litigation, 
we suspect that both the government and the lower 
courts feel exasperated that having been relieved of 
the obligation to purchase contraceptives, the Little 
Sisters of the Poor and other objectors have the 
temerity to challenge the Department’s regulations.5  
                                                 
5 Writing for the Seventh Circuit, for example, Judge Posner 
rather shockingly suggested that the plaintiff, a Christian 
liberal arts college, was lying when it claimed that it would 
have no RFRA objection to the Department’s regulations if the 
College’s health care plan was not used to distribute 
abortifacients.  See Wheaton College v. Burwell, 2015 WL 
3988356, *6 (“At oral argument Wheaton’s lawyer said that his 
client has no objection to the government’s using the college’s 
insurers to provide emergency-contraceptive coverage as long as 
(cont'd) 
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Such impatience, however, is neither warranted nor 
a sound basis for legal analysis.  The fact that the 
government has avoided violating RFRA by forcing 
the Little Sisters of the Poor to pay for contraceptives 
does not leave HHS free to violate RFRA by 
commandeering the nuns’ health care plans.  See 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2775 
(2014) (“By requiring [religious objectors] … to 
arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate 
demands that they engage in conduct that seriously 
violates their religious beliefs” (emphasis added)). 
2. It is irrelevant that the paperwork 
required is “de minimis.” 
The Tenth Circuit and other lower courts have 
also emphasized that the Department’s regulations 
require only that objectors fill out a simple form. See 
Pet. App. 48a (“[T]hese de minimis administrative 
tasks do not substantially burden religious exercise 
for purposes of RFRA”). Doing so would take at most 
a few minutes and is far less onerous than other 
regulations with which the Little Sisters of the Poor 
must comply.  Compare Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 
________________________ 
(cont'd from previous page) 
it’s not ‘using’ Wheaton’s contract with the insurers …. We 
wonder.”).  Elsewhere, in the opinion Judge Posner suggested 
that the plaintiff’s real goal was to make it more difficult for 
students to obtain abortifacients.  See id. at *5 (“But it seeks to 
make that access more difficult”).   These asides were irrelevant 
to the legal questions Judge Posner was addressing, but they do 
reveal an unfortunate unwillingness to consider the nature of 
the religious burdens created by the Department’s regulations.  
It also speaks to the need for this Court to grant certiorari in 
order to analyze these nationally important issues. 
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237 (“All Plaintiffs must do to opt out is to express 
what they believe and seek what they want via a 
letter or two-page form.  That bit of paperwork is 
more straightforward and minimal than many that 
are staples of nonprofit organizations’ compliance 
with law in the modern administrative state.”). This 
argument also misunderstands the nature of the 
religious burden in this case. What is objectionable 
about the Department’s regulations is not that they 
require religious institutions to fill out additional 
paperwork.  Rather, those regulations create a 
burden by forcing religious institutions to participate 
in the delivery of medications to which they have 
sincere and grievous religious objections by 
commandeering their property. 
 
B. Widespread religious objections to 
the regulations make a grant of 
certiorari proper. 
The nuns claim that through forced complicity 
in the delivery of contraceptives and abortifacients, 
the government will “substantially burden [their] 
religious exercises.” See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a)  
(2012).  They are not alone in this belief.  The 
Department chose only to exempt “churches” from 
the ACA’s contraceptive mandate, but hundreds of 
organizations that fail to qualify as “churches” 
nevertheless have grave religious objections to forced 
complicity in the delivery of contraception or 
abortifacients.  
 
 To give a single example, the Catholic Church 
has well-articulated and long-standing religious 
objections to both contraception and abortifacients.  
See JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE (1995) 
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(articulating the Catholic Church’s opposition to 
abortion); PAUL VII, HUMANAE VITAE (1968) 
(articulating the Catholic Church’s opposition to 
artificial birth control).  It is reasonable to suppose 
that some Catholic organizations will challenge any 
law that requires that they be complicit in providing 
such drugs.  There are hundreds of Catholic religious 
orders, primary and secondary schools, colleges and 
universities, and social service organizations in the 
United States.  See generally THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC 
DIRECTORY ANNO DOMINI 2015 (2015).  Perhaps the 
most compelling evidence that the Little Sisters of 
the Poor raise “an important question of federal law 
that… should be settled by this Court,” Sup. Ct. R. 
10(c), is that the Department’s regulations have been 
repeatedly challenged in the lower courts by both 
Catholic organizations and non-Catholic 
organizations.  See Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 
HHS Information Central, 
 http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ 
(tracking all of the litigation challenging the 
contraception mandate). 
 
Unless this Court grants the Little Sisters of 
the Poor’s petition for a writ of certiorari, their ability 
and the ability of those similarly situated to 
challenge the Department’s regulations will be at an 
end.  This is true, even though the court below failed 
to understand the nature of the burden created by 
those regulations and despite the fact that the 
government has not been required to explain why it 
is necessary to threaten these nuns with millions of 
dollars in fines to achieve its objectives or even 
precisely what its objectives in crafting this 
particular regulatory mechanism might be.  Several 
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other circuit courts have also blessed the 
Department’s regulations.  See Wheaton College v. 
Burwell, 2015 WL 3988356 (7th Cir. July 1, 2015), 
East Texas Baptist v. Burwell, 2015 WL 3852811 (5th 
Cir. June 22, 2015, Geneva College v. Health & 
Human Services Secretary, 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 
2015), Priests for Life v. Department of Health & 
Human Services, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
Unless this Court grants certiorari, it will be 
impossible for religious institutions in much of the 
country to have their religious objections properly 
considered, despite the clear Congressional mandate 
that courts weigh the interest in government 
regulation against the burdens those regulations 
impose on sincere religious beliefs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, amici respectfully believe 
that this case warrants a grant of certiorari.  
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